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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRYCE E. ROE, RALPH L. JERMAN 
and B. L. DART, JR., doing business 
as ROE, JERMAN & DART, a part-
nership, and ROE, J E R M A N & 
DART, a business partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory relief brought by 
Plaintiffs asking the lower Court to find that Section 20-
3-2 (a) Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
Amended, is unconstitutional, and, in addition, is in excess 
of the authority of Appellant Salt Lake City as granted in 
Section 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1962. For the Court's 
review the complete Ordinance is set out as Appendix 1 in 
this Brief. 
Case No. 
10974 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Based upon the pleadings, answers to interrogatories 
and memoranda filed by Plaintiffs and Defendant, respect-
ively, the lower Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment and held that the Ordinance in question 
(Salt Lake City Ordinance, Section 20-3-2 (b) (a)) was un-
constitutional as applied to Plaintiffs and that Defendant 
was without statutory authorization to enact the same un-
der 10-8-80 U. C. A., 1962. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL 
Appellant appeals from the order of summary judg-
ment entered against it and asks that this Court reverse 
the same and hold that Appellant is entitled to summary 
judgment in its favor, sustaining the constitutional validity 
of the questioned Ordinance, 20-3-2 (a) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case was submitted to the trial Court on stipulated 
facts as set out in the pleadings and published interrogator-
ies. Appellant's Statement of Facts in its Brief, while essen-
tially correct, falls short of a full presentation of the sub-
stantial facts particularly with respect to the unreasonable 
and arbitrary discrimination evoked by the Ordinance as 
disclosed by the City's answers to interrogatories. 
Accepting, therefore, the Appellant's Statement as far 
as it extends, the following facts should be and are added 
as bearing upon the actual discrimination evoked by the 
questioned Ordinance against the Plaintiffs. The City in 
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its answers to interrogatories, admitted that the Ordinance 
resulted in the following comparisons (assuming gross 
business revenues to exceed $10,000.00 annually) : 
A partnership of three lawyers with two secretary 
employees would be taxed $96.00 ($30 per partner), 
while a partnership of three stockbrokers with two 
secretary employees would be taxed $42.00 ($30 for 
the first partner and $3 each additional partner or em-
ployee). A chemical corporation with five employees 
(three of whom are stockholders) would also be taxed 
$42.00. 
A law partnership consisting of ten partners, ten 
associate lawyers and fifteen legal stenographers would 
be taxed $875.00, while a mining corporation with thir-
ty-five full time employees consisting of a manager, 
thirteen mining engineers, one staff lawyer, two ac-
countants, one surveyor, one appraiser and fifteen 
stenographers would be taxed only $132.00. (See De-
fendant's answers to interrogatories R. 17-22.) 
Appellant in its Brief acknowledges "that the license tax 
imposed upon partners and associates engaged in the enum-
erated professions is greater than the license tax imposed 
upon partners and associates in other non-professional busi-
ness" (App. Br. p. 4) . And the lower Court determined 
that the Ordinance did in fact require Plaintiffs "to pay 
a license fee tax on a formula and basis which exceeds and 
is substantially dissimilar from the license fee tax paid by 
non-professional individuals, partnerships, corporations and 
associations" (R. 30-32). 
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The trial Court further found and as a part of its Find-
ings stated that "when compared to non-professional busi-
ness individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associa-
tions, the license tax under the Ordinance is dissimilar and 
excessive as to Plaintiffs, solely by virtue of the fact that 
the individual Plaintiffs are practicing lawyers and Plain-
tiff-partnership is a law partnership" (Findings of Fact R. 
31). It concluded that there was "no reasonable basis for 
discriminating between Plaintiffs and non-professional bus-
iness individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associa-
tions" under the Ordinance (R. 32), and that it, therefore, 
was unconstitutional and void, since it denied to Plaintiffs 
due process of law and the full and equal protection of the 
law (R. 32-33). In so doing, the trial Court decreed that 
Appellant was without the limits of statutory authority un-
der §10-8-80 U. C. A., 1962, to enact the Ordinance. 
One additional comment is required respecting the 
facts before the Court. Appellant has attached, as an Ap-
pendix to its Appeal Brief, a pamphlet entitled "Economic 
Facts About Law Practice", which purportedly was pub-
lished by a committee of the American Bar Association in 
1966. Considerable reliance is placed on this pamphlet by 
the City not as an authoritative treatise or precedent which 
bears upon the legal issues before the Court, but as proof 
of the truth of independent, evidentiary facts regarding the 
income of latvyers doing business in a partnership or as sole 
practitioners in Utah. (S'ee App. Br. pp. 22-23.) 
An inspection of the record in this case will reveal that 
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this pamphlet was not introduced in evidence in the trial 
Court and it is not before this Court on appeal. Indeed, the 
appendix was not even offered in the lower Court, Plain-
tiffs have had no opportunity to object to its admissibility 
on the grounds of relevancy, lack of foundation, and hear-
say, and the trial Court has had no opportunity to consider 
any such proffer of evidence or to be apprised of its nature. 
This Court has spoken sufficiently on the matter, as to 
make the citation of precedent needless, that factual mat-
ters may not be introduced for the first time on appeal and 
that this Court will not consider any proffer of new facts 
in the determination of the appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
move and petition the Court to strike the Appendix to Ap-
pellant's Brief, or to disregard the same in its consideration 
of the issues of law presented. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ORDINANCE 20-3-2 EVOKES AN UNCONSTI-
T U T I O N A L DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Factually, there is no dispute whatsoever that attorn-
eys are subjected to a substantially heavier tax burden than 
are all other non-professional businesses. It is Plaintiffs' 
contention that this discriminatory treatment cannot be 
justified and thus renders the tax, as applied to them, un-
constitutionally void. 
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The guiding principle in analyzing such discrimination 
was stated in Orem City v. Pyne, 16 U. 2d 355, 401 P. 2d 
181 (1965) wherein this Court adopted an opinion of Dis-
trict Judge Maurice Harding: 
"[C]ity licensing ordinances enacted for tax 
purposes must be strictly construed, and in cases of 
reasonable doubt, the construction should be against 
the government. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine 
Co., 284 U. S. 498, 52 S. Ct. 260, 263, 76 L. Ed. 422. 
Appeals of School District of City of Allentown 
(1952) 370 Pa. 161, 87 A. 2d 480." Judge Harding's 
opinion, page 2. 
The full text of Judge Harding's opinion in the Orem City 
case is set out herein as Appendix 2. 
Plaintiffs do not contend herein that the City does not 
have the power to levy any tax at all against members of the 
legal profession. This question was w^ll settled by 10-8-80 
U. C. A. (Repl. Vol. 1962) as applied to lawyers by the 
Court in Davis V. City of Ogden, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 
616 (1959). Under Davis, lawyers are subject to a munici-
pal license fee tax, as are other members of the business 
community. But neither Davis nor §10-8-80, gives the City 
the discretion or authority to enact a discriminatory and 
abusive tax against attorneys. In point of fact, §10-8-80 ex-
pressly proscribes the same by conditioning the City's power 
as follows: 
"All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform 
in respect to the class upon which they are imposed." 
And as noted in Mathews V. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac. 
303 (1900), a similar prohibition against discrimination is 
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to be found in the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal 
Constitution. (Amendment XIV.) 
The basic question, therefore, is whether there is a 
reasonable basis for taxing the business of a lawyer differ-
ently than non-professional business organizations. This 
Court has previously spelled out the test to be applied: 
"Our function is to determine whether an enact-
ment operates equally on all persons similarly sit-
uated. If it does, then the discrimination is within 
permissible legislative limits. If it does not, then 
the differentiation would be without reasonable 
basis and the act does not meet the test of constitu-
tionality." Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 
489, 206 P. 2d 153, 160 (1949). (Emphasis added.) 
This question is answered without ambiguity by this 
Court in its opinion in Davis v. Ogden City, supra. The 
Ordinance in that case, enacted by Ogden City, provided 
that each person who engaged in business had to obtain a 
business license. The fee for the license was graduated ac-
cording to the gross receipts of the business. In the defini-
tion of "business", the Ordinance provided that it should 
include "persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft, 
business, occupation, or other calling." Consequently, the 
Ogden Ordinance applied equally and on the same basis to 
all businesses, be they professional, non-professional or 
whatever. (The Salt Lake City Ordinance, as noted above, 
does not have this virtue of uniformity.) The first question 
before the Court in Davis was whether the City had the 
power to exact such a tax from members of the legal pro-
fession. In its opinion, this Court analyzed the statutory 
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basis for such a tax and concluded that Ogden City had the 
power to tax businesses, including the professions. 
However, in reaching this decision, the Court made a 
number of observations which are of paramount importance 
to the proper determination of the instant case. In holding 
that the Ogden tax was not discriminatory, this Court 
stressed the fact that the Ordinance applied equally to "all 
businesses" within the corporate limits of the city and with-
out any economic discrimination as between lawyers and 
other businesses. 
In fact, the Davis decision goes to great lengths to 
point out that lawyers, so far as being liable for the tax, 
held no protective sanctuary or immunity from the Ordin-
ance. Lawyers were to be treated as other businesses, there 
being no justification for classifying lawyers differently 
than others in the Community. In this regard, the Court 
stated : 
"As members of the Bar, their admission to 
practice and their professional conduct after admis-
sion are essentially matters to be regulated by the 
judicial department of the state. As members and 
citizens of the state, county, and city, their rights, 
privileges and immunities, as well as their duty to 
pay a fair share of the expenses of government, like 
those of any other citizen, are controlled by the laws, 
ordinances and regulations of the political body of 
which they are a part and from which they receive 
protection. No one could reasonably contend that 
lawyers as a class are not subject to laws enacted 
pursuant to the police powers of the state or munici-
pality and the members of the profession would pro-
test any attempt to deny to them the services af-
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forded by the various sovreignties. There is no 
rational basis for a contention that lawyers are 
privileged because of their calling and should not be 
subject to the provisions of an ordinance enacted for 
the purpose of raising revenue to defray city ex-
penses unless there is a showing that the ordinance 
is discriminatory" 215 P. 2d at 622-23 (Emphasis 
added.) 
The rationale carved out by the Court in Davis is of major 
consequence here. For the Ogden license tax was sustained 
in the Davis decision for the single reason that the Ordin-
ance treated attorneys in the same fashion and equally 
with other businesses. The Court continued in Davis V. 
Ogden City: 
"The municipality, in imposing an occupational 
tax upon attorneys, is not interfering with state reg-
ulations, for it is not attempting to prescribe quali-
fications for attorneys different from or additional 
to those prescribed by the state. It is merely provid-
ing for an increase in its revenue by imposing a tax 
upon those who, by pursuing their profession within 
its limits, are deriving benefits from the advantages 
especially afforded by the city. The tax is levied up-
on the business of practicing law, rather than upon 
a person because he is an attorney at law" 215 P. 
2d at 623. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court, therefore, has already determined the point 
here in question. In Davis, it was held that there is no 
rational basis for a reasonable classification as between 
lawyers and other businesses. In Davis, the effect was that 
lawyers should be taxed the same as other businesses and 
that is all that Plaintiffs ask here — to be treated the 
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same, no better and no worse, than all other businesses. The 
classification with which we are here concerned is composed 
of "businesses". The Court in Davis emphasized this as fol-
lows: 
"Being an occupation tax, the classification is 
reasonable and not arbitrary because it includes all 
businesses operated within the city. There is no de-
nial of equal protection, no invasion of the privileges 
and immunities of any class of citizens and the or-
dinance operates equally upon all persons similarly 
situated." 215 P. 2d at 623. (Emphasis added.) 
Equality is the very element missing in Ordinance 20-3-2 (a) 
under attack herein. It specifically and intentionally dis-
criminates against lawyers and other professional business 
organizations. 
The principles thus enunciated in Davis have been more 
recently reaffirmed in Orem City V. Pyne, supra. This case 
also dealt with an occupation tax enacted under the color 
of §10-8-80 U. C. A. (Repl. Vol. 1962). Judge Harding ana-
lyzed the problem as follows: 
"[T]he classification by the legislative body 
must be reasonable and the tax must be applied with 
uniformity upon similar kinds of businesses and 
with substantial equality of the tax burden to all 
members of the same class. The imposition of taxes 
which are to a substantial degree unequal in their 
operation upon similar kinds of businesses is pro-
hibited." Page 3 of Judge Harding's opinion. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Based upon this reasoning Judge Harding and subsequently 
this Court held that the Orem City tax was unconsititutional 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
as applied because it accorded a different treatment to var-
ious businesses engaged in the sale of tangible personal 
property. As put in the Harding opinion and ratified by 
this Court: 
"Why should one business selling tangible per-
sonal property at retail be subjected to a tax of up 
to $300.00 per year, while other businesses (also 
selling tangible personal property at retail) such 
as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement 
plant, creamery, butcher shop, photography shop, 
or a dealer specializing in the sale of goods made in 
Japan, Hong Kong, Formosa, China, or India, doing 
the same volume of business, be taxed $25.00 ?" Page 
3 of Judge Harding's opinion. 
The same reasoning applies with equal finesse to the Or-
dinance now before the Court. To paraphrase the rationale 
of the Or em- City decision: 
"Why should a firm of three lawyers with two 
secretaries be taxed $96.00 per year while other bus-
inesses also rendering personal and individual ser-
vices, such as a stock brokerage, a firm of chemists, 
a public relations firm, an advertising firm, a beauty 
shop, a firm of automotive technicians, an assay of-
fice, a private detective agency doing business in 
the same volume, the same income, and with the 
same structure be taxed only $42.00 ?" 
The answer to this rhetorical question must be the same as 
that found by this Court in Orem City v. Pyne — the tax is 
"unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory." Interest-
ingly, Appellant fails to refer to, cite, or discuss the holding 
in the Orem City opinion, although the case was the subject 
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of much attention in the arguments before the trial Court 
herein. 
In light of the patent discrimination of the subject Or-
dinance, the following statement in Mathews V. Jensen, 21 
Utah 207, 227, 61 Pac. 303, 308 (1900) is apropos: 
•'Private rights cannot thus be arbitrarily in-
vaded or annihilated, under the mere guise of a li-
cense. One class of citizens can not thus be com-
pelled to bear the burdens of government, to the ad-
vantage of all other classes. The law, as we have 
seen, will not permit it. Neither the Constitution nor 
the statute authorizes boards of county commission-
ers to enact ordinances, as in this instance, to tax 
citizens arbitrarily and unjustly, by license which 
confers no privilege that was not previously enjoyed, 
and which has no view to regulation." 
It requires no extension of this philosophy to hold that one 
professional business, i.e., lawyers, cannot be taxed more 
oppressively than another business of a non-professional 
nature. In this instance the professional business organiza-
tions, being taxed at a greater rate, are bearing an unjust 
portion of the burdens of government, to the general bene-
fit of non-professional organizations. As noted in Mathews 
V. Jensen, supra, such discrimination constitutes a denial 
of equal protection under both the state and federal consti-
tutions as well as the deprivation of property without due 
process of law. 
The City concedes at page 15 of its Brief, that a license 
tax must "operate on all alike under the same circum-
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stances", but argues that the Ordinance under attack herein 
does not discriminate and "applies equally to all persons 
similarly situated". (App. Br. p. 29.) It is this very point 
which brings into focus the gravamen of the offense which 
the Ordinance 20-3-2 (a) commits. What is there about the 
partnership business of a lawyer which distinguishes it 
from a partnership or corporate business of a grocery mer-
chant, a stockbroker, industrial development firm, advertis-
ing firm, public relation experts, barbers or any other mem-
bers of the community who offer personal services? The 
Ordinance certainly does not provide us with any reason 
why such businesses, including lawyers, are not "similarly 
situaited". The trial Court found that there was no rational 
basis to single out lawyers from other personal service non-
professional businesses for excessive license tax. That Find-
ing is fully warranted for there is no reasonable criterion 
or basis to discriminate against Plaintiffs and other lawyers 
under this type of a license revenue tax. 
Appellant apparently claims, as a basis for discrimina-
tory treatment, that the combination of lawyers doing busi-
ness as a partnership increases the respective income of 
each partner. Assuming for argument the truth of that 
statement, is it any less true that combinations of stock-
brokers, chemists, public relation agents and merchants do-
ing business as partners, corporations or other associations 
also return higher incomes than sole proprietorships? We 
submit not. All such business associations are on equal 
plane so far as the capability to produce income is con-
cerned. 
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The nub of Appellant's argument seems to be that the 
businesses of lawyers may be subjected to a higher license 
fee tax than the businesses of all non-professionals because 
of the amount of income produced in the lawyer's business. 
Were the subject Ordinance a graduated income tax and 
were all businesses, partnerships, corporations, sole proprie-
torships, and other associations subject to the same tax, Ap-
pellant's argument would have some merit. (See Davis V. 
Ogden City, supra.) But the Ordinance in question is not 
that type of tax. Its enabling clause refers to it as a license 
tax levied upon the business of every person in Salt Lake 
City. It is only after reciting the general enacting clause as 
to all businesses that an excess formula is set out for a com-
putation of the license fee as to lawyers and other profes-
sions. See Appendix 1. It is that formula, biased and dis-
criminatory as it is, which renders the Ordinance unconsti-
tutionally void and unenforceable. 
POINT II. 
AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTIVE OF ITS POSITION IN THIS 
CASE. 
Appellant has cited in its brief several decisions in aid 
of its contention that the trial Court erred in declaring the 
Ordinance unconstitutional. For the most part, these cases 
are distinguishable on their facts from the case at bar, and 
in several instances, such authorities actually support the 
judgment of the trial Court and the position of Plaintiffs 
herein. 
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We welcome Appellant's citation of authorities which 
essentially hold that a license fee tax "must operate equally 
on all persons similarly situated". Clark V. Titusville, 184 
U. S. 329 (1902). (Appellant's Brief p. 15.) Nor do we 
find any fault with Appellant's quotations from the Corpus 
Juris Secundum to the effect that "different licenses or 
taxes [may] be imposed on the various classes, provided 
that the classification is reasonable and is defined with fair 
certainty." 53 C. J. S. Licenses Sec. 22(a) and (b) at 535-
37. (Appellant's Br. p. 10.) These principles are fully em-
bodied in the decisions of this Court in Davis v. City of 
Ogden, supra, and Orem City v. Pyne, supra, and as dis-
cussed in Point I of this Brief, are the touchstone of the 
finding of unconstitutionality herein. 
In a number of cases cited by Appellant, the taxing Or-
dinance under construction established classifications of 
taxpayers on the basis of gross revenue, capital worth, or 
some other objective economic standard. Salt Lake City v. 
Christenson Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523 (1908); Clark V. 
Titusville, supra; Garbade v. City of Portland, 188 Ore. 158, 
214 P. 2d 1000 (1950). In those cases, no type of business 
was singled out by name for excessive or disparate tax 
treatment. In those cases no business or partnership of 
lawyers was required to pay a $96.00 license fee tax while 
other businesses in the community, using the same commun-
ity services, employing the same number of personnel and 
producing the same or a greater amount of income, were 
taxed $42.00. Those are the facts with which we are here 
dealing, and it is that simple but substantial difference 
which makes such cases cited by Appellant unauthoritative. 
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Menlove V. Salt Lake County, 18 U. 2d 203, 418 P. 2d: 
227 (1966) and Garret Freightlines, Inc. V. State Tax Com-
mission, 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523 (1943), referred to 
in Appellant's Brief are distinguishable and irrelevant since 
they were not enacted under the authority or sanction of a 
statute such as Utah Code Ann. §10-8-80 (the enabling leg-
islation for the instant ordinance) which, itself, requires 
that the license taxes imposed must be uniform with respect 
to the class upon which they are imposed. 
Appellant places considerable weight on the case of 
City of San Mateo V. Mallin, 59 Cal. App. 2d 653,139 P. 2d 
351 (1943). The Ordinance there in question, unlike that 
now being reviewed, applied equally to all businesses alike. 
Lawyers and other professions were not singled out for 
special treatment. The following quotation from that case 
clearly illustrates this fact: 
"The ordinance was amended in April, 1936, to 
provide that where two or more persons of like busi-
nesses, trade calling or profession are associated as 
partners, or as employer and employee, then an ad-
ditional license tax in a less amount shall be paid for 
each additional person after the first." 139 P. 2d at 
352. 
Under the San Mateo Ordinance, therefore, any part-
nership or association had to bear the additional tax 
whether it consisted of lawyers or meat cutters. This is ex-
actly the type of treatment which Plaintiffs here seek — to 
be taxed the same, no greater and no lesser, than all other 
associations and organizations in the business community. 
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Indeed, the Mullin case goes even further to point up the 
distinction which seems to have evaded Appellant here: 
"While the state certificate is a prerequisite to 
practice, the actual practice is a business . . . . 
The tax is levied upon the business and not the per-
son. Whether that business is conducted by one, or 
more than one, associated as partners or as em-
ployer and employee it is still in the class of business 
as that word is used in the ordinance." 139 P. 2d at 
354. (Emphasis added.) 
A full reading of the Mullin decision will disclose that it 
buttresses the position of Plaintiffs, here, and substantially 
rejects the arguments of Appellant. 
Appellant refers to the early case of Blanchard V. State 
of Florida, 30 Fla. 223, 11 So. 785 (1892), which involved 
almost exclusively the interpretation of a local statute. It 
is apparent from the decision in Blanchard that no question 
of constitutionality of the statute was raised therein, either 
as to the due process or equal protection which it afforded. 
Accordingly, it has no place in the determination of the 
issues raised in this appeal. It is unnecessary to discuss, 
piece by piece and case by case, the remaining decisions 
from other jurisdictions cited by Appellant in its Brief, for 
they can be placed in the same catalogs, distinguishable on 
their facts from the facts before this Court, or as having 
been determined without consideration of the constitutional 
issues raised by Plaintiffs herein. 
In the ultimate analysis herein, decisions from without 
Utah are of no more than academic interest, for this case 
may be resolved upon the firm precedent of the decisions of 
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this Court in Davis V. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 
616 (1959) and Or em City V. Pyne, 16 U. 2d 355, 401 P. 2d 
181 (1965), viewed in light of the statutory authorization 
of 10-8-80 U. C. A. The discrimination, without reason or 
justification, against Plaintiffs in this case, is obvious. It 
may not be condoned or sanctioned under the guise of legis-
lative discretion of Salt Lake City or under an attempt to 
label as a graduated income tax what is in fact and law, a 
license fee tax. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ordinance 20-3-2 of Salt Lake City, unfairly, un-
reasonably and arbitrarily discriminates against the Plain-
tiffs and denies to them due process of law and the full and 
equal protection of the law as guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 7 
of the Utah State Constitution and Amendment XIV of the 
United States Constitution. 
The determination of the trial Court herein that said 
Ordinance is unconstitutional that it unreasonably discrim-
inates against the Plaintiffs and that it denies to them their 
constitutional guarantees, should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
GORDON L. ROBERTS, 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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APPENDIX NUMBER 2 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4039 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
and 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Dee Pyne was charged with the crime of a misde-
meanor in failing to pay a license tax to Orem City for an 
automobile business operated by him in Orem. He was con-
victed in the Orem City Court and has appealed his convic-
tion to the District Court, claiming that the license ordin-
ance is void as to him. 
The defendant's appeal entitles him to a trial de novo. 
He has entered anew a plea of not guilty, but has stipulated 
that during the time charged in the complaint he conducted 
a used car business and made sales subject to the sales tax 
imposed by the State of Utah; and that he has not paid any 
Orem City license tax. He now moves the court for a dis-
missal of the complaint, solely on the ground that the or-
dinance is invalid in imposing any tax on his used car sales 
business. 
Ordinance No. 26 of Orem City is the ordinance in 
question. It was enacted under the authority given to cities 
by Section 10-8-80 U. C. A. 1953, to tax businesses for rev-
enue purposes; provided, however, "that all such license 
OREM CITY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff', 
vs. 
DEE PYNE, 
Defendant 
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fees and taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class upon 
which they are imposed." The ordinancie declares that its 
purpose is to raise revenue. 
Section 3 of the ordinance levies a tax of 1/10 of 1% 
on the gross sales of businesses in Orem City engaged in 
selling tangible personal property, where such sales are 
subject to the Utah State sales tax, with a minimum of 
$6.25 per quarter-year and a maximum of $75.00 for the 
same period. 
If the defendant's business is covered at all it is cov-
ered by this general Section, and not by any specific provi-
sion of the ordinance. 
The law presumes that the ordinance is valid until the 
contrary is shown. However, city licensing ordinances en-
acted for tax purposes must be strictly construed, and in 
cases of reasonable doubt, the construction should be 
against the government. Miller v. Standard Nut Margar-
ine Co., 284 U. S. 498, 52 S. Ct. 260, 263, 76 L. Ed. 422. 
Appeal of School District of City of Allentown, (1952), 370 
Pa. 161, 87 A. 2d 480. 
The principal claim for invalidity is that the ordinance 
is discriminatory and arbitrary in its application to defen-
dant's business. 
In Matthews v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303, at page 
277 of the Utah Reports, our Supreme Court said: "Neither 
the constitution nor the statute authorizes . . . ordin-
ances, . . . to tax citizens arbitrarily and unjustly, by 
license which confers no privilege that was not previously 
enjoyed, and which has no view to regulation. Unjust and 
illegal discrimination between persons in taxation, and the 
denial of equal justice, are within the prohibitions of the 
constitution of this state, and of the United States." 
As to what constitutes illegal and unjust discrimination 
in taxation, our Court has held: "Discrimination is the 
essence of classification and does violence to the constitu-
tion only when the basis upon which it is founded is unrea-
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sonable, In fixing the limits of the class, the legislative body 
has a wide discretion and this court may not concern itself 
with the wisdom or policy of the law. Our function is to de-
termine whether an enactment operates equally upon all 
persons similarly situated. If it does then the discrimination 
is within permissible legislative limits. If it does not, then 
the discrimination would be without reasonable basis and 
the act does not meet the test of constitutionality." Slater 
v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P. 2d 153. 
This indicates that the classification by the legislative 
body must be reasonable and the tax must be applied with 
uniformity upon similar kinds of businesses and with sub-
stantial equality of the tax burden to all members of the 
same class. The imposition of taxes which are to a substan-
tial degree unequal in their operation upon similar kinds of 
businesses is prohibited. 
What is the situation with respect to discrimination 
and reasonableness as this ordinance is written and may be 
applied and enforced ? 
Section 1 of the ordinance lists 201 purported busi-
nesses for taxation and fixes a tax rate for each. A few of 
these names do not indicate businesses at all and are beyond 
the power of the City to tax for revenue purposes. Exclud-
ing these few, the remainder represent legitimate busi-
nesses, subject to taxation for revenue purposes. Even here, 
however, the lack of definitions renders the application of 
the ordinance and the tax uncertain, confusing, and perhaps 
inequitable. And since this section and the ordinance as a 
whole does not attempt to tax all businesses within the city, 
it may well be questioned as to any equality in spreading the 
tax burden. 
Section 3, standing alone, appears to be fair, reason-
able, and definite in its application to all businesses gener-
ally in Orem City selling tangible personal property. This 
is a reasonable and proper classification fixed by the City. 
The difficulty arises when Section 1 is conisdered along 
with Section 3; because Section 1 places several businesses, 
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that would otherwise be covered by Section 3, on a flat an-
nual fee basis that may be only one-twelfth as much as if 
they were on the gross sales basis, and taxable under Sec-
tion 3. Why should one business selling tangible personal 
property at retail be subjected to a tax of up to $300.00 per 
year, while other businesses (also selling tangible personal 
property at retail) such as an implement dealer, an appli-
ance shop, cement plant, creamery, butcher shop, photogra-
phy shop, or a dealer specializing in the sale of goods made 
in Japan, Hong Kong, Formosa, China, or India, doing the 
same volume of business, be taxed $25.00? 
To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a reasonable 
classification of businesses generally for taxation and fix a 
tax rate therefor based on gross sales with certain mini-
mum and maximum amounts, and by another section of the 
same ordinance exclude from the operation of Section 3, 
certain businesses naturally falling within its classification, 
and apply to such excluded businesses a tax rate on a flat 
annual basis that cannot possibly be more than the mini-
mum for the unexcluded businesses is unreasonable, arbi-
trary, and discriminatory. Such exclusion assures to the 
excluded businesses a concession not accorded to other busi-
nesses similarly situated. 
It is clear that the ordinance is void as it applies to the 
defendant's business in this case, and the motion for dis-
missal is granted. 
This ruling is limited to the question presented by the 
defendant's motion. It is not within the province of the 
Court at this time to pass on the validity of the entire or-
dinance. It may be valid as to some businesses and invalid 
as to others. As hereinabove stated, in a few instances 
there seems to be an entire absence of authority for the city 
to impose any tax at all for revenue purposes. 
Dated this 3rd day of August, 1964. 
MAURICE HARDING, Judge. 
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